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ABSTRACT 
Given his commitment to the project of naturalizing every normative aspect of philosophy; 
reducing its a priori content to some sort of empirical enterprise, Quine’s inroad into moral 
philosophy is expected to set the stage for the project of naturalizing ethics. However, Quine 
argues that ethics is methodologically infirmed. Hence, the hope of naturalizing ethics hits 
the rock. This paper aims at advancing the project of naturalizing ethics by an attempt to 
settle, in a way different from the postulations of Flanagan and White, foremost 
commentators on Quinean ethics, Quine’s charge of methodological infirmity.  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Since 1978, when Quine published his only paper on ethics entitled “On the 
Nature of Moral Values”1, quite unlike many of his publications in other areas 
of philosophy, the level of debate generated by this essay is quite low2. Possible 
reasons that could be adduced for this are, first, Quine is delving into a strange 
land and had probably not said anything controversial enough that is worthy of 
academic dispute. Second, Quine’s aim is to show that, unlike other areas of 
discourse, given the specialty of Ethics, its method makes it to be outside the 
‘naturalized world’ and having shown this, there is nothing more to debate. 
While my first postulation is trivial, hence, indefensible, the second postulation 
is cogent3. Scholars who had written on Quinean Ethics so far are sharply 
                                                 
1 The paper was first published in Goldman A.I. and Kin J. (eds.) (1978: 37-46). The version 
referred to in this paper is in Quine W.V. (1981:55-66). 
2 The only known substantive articles on Quinean Ethics are four. These are Flanagan O. J. 
(1982: 56-74), White M. (1986: 649-662), Gibson Roger F., “Flanagan on Quinean Ethics” 
(the version of this paper I used in writing this paper is unpublished.) and Quine’s “Reply to 
White”. (1986: 663-665). 
3 Several arguments are being offered to underscore the appeal of naturalism. The possible 
truth of these arguments exacerbates the need to incorporate ethics into the naturalist 
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divided on whether or not Quine is right in arguing that on the basis of 
methodology, ethics and science are quite different in all ramifications. 
Flanagan and White hold that for Quine to be a consistent naturalist, his 
conclusion that ethics is methodologically infirm is unwarranted, hence, he 
ought to continue with the project of naturalizing ethics. Gibson, on the other 
hand, supports Quine in arguing that on the basis of methodology, ethics and 
science do not belong to the same boat. 
In what follows, I shall attempt to advance Quine’s project of naturalizing 
ethics by an attempt to settle, in a way, different from the postulations of 
Flanagan and White, Quine’s charge of methodological infirmity against ethics. 
In what follows, a short explication of Quine’s account on the genealogy of 
moral values is carried out to establish the point that moral value is generated 
in the same way as it is done in science and other naturalized discourses. This is 
followed by a concise exposition of Quine’s argument for the charge of 
methodological infirmity against ethics. In an attempt to advance Quine’s 
project of naturalizing ethics, the difference between the notions of possible 
worlds and actual or natural world would be used to explain the existence of 
moral facts to which moral judgments would correspond. This is used to show, 
in the conclusion, that ethics as compared to science is not methodologically 
infirm. 
 
 
2. The Technology of Moral Values 
 
Ethics is a branch of philosophy that is concerned with the body of principles or 
standards of human conduct that govern the behavior of individuals and 
groups. It is considered a normative science because it is concerned with the 
norms of human conduct, as distinguished from formal sciences such as 
mathematics and logic, physical sciences such as chemistry and physics, and 
empirical sciences such as economics and psychology. Ethics arise not simply 
from man's creation but from human nature itself making it a natural body of 
________________________________________ 
programme. See Virginia Held, (2002: 7-24), for a few of the arguments on the appeal of 
naturalism. Quite pointedly, in this article, Held, p. 8, also argued that “naturalism holds out 
hope of philosophical knowledge that will progress along with advances in specialized 
scientific inquiries, and of moral knowledge that will advance along with scientific 
knowledge”. 
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laws from which man's laws follow. As Schueler observes, “The human 
conceptual apparatus, including that part of it involved in making and acting 
on moral judgments, is somehow instantiated in the brain and nervous 
system”4. Ethics is a natural, scientific and technical phenomenon. This 
suggests that ethics exists as parts of the natural structure of the world. It 
evolves on its own course, as response to the other structures of the world. It is 
parts of the supporting pillars of the natural world, without which the world 
would have been different. Put differently, ethics is a metaphoric walking stick 
that human beings, one of the structures of the world, need to stand, withstand 
and walk through the other features of the world5. Hence, as speculated in the 
philosophy of Democritus, “struggling to survive against hostile forces in his 
environment, man is compelled to associate himself with other men; hence 
speech. He is also compelled to learn from experience; hence the mechanical 
arts.”6 This compulsion is explained by the fact that ethics, as one of the fabrics 
of the world, complements other features of the world. It is, therefore, a natural 
phenomenon subscribed to by every rational human being. Hence, just as every 
other structures of the world is studied Ethics, the moral institution qualifies as 
a natural edifice, which as Quine notes, is “to be studied in the same empirical 
spirit that animates natural science”.7 
One important characteristic that distinguishes human beings from other 
species of animals is the ability to make rational and informed choices. These 
choices are motivated by values. Hence, Quine explicates the relationship 
between the capacity to make rational and informed choices and the value of 
the choices made. For Quine, this capacity and the value made are intertwined. 
Encompassed in the concept of capacity is what Quine call ‘belief’. For Quine, 
‘belief and valuation intertwined’.8 In the belief aspect are the epistemological 
components of the ability to make rational and informed choices. The 
epistemological components among other, “involves standards of perceptual 
                                                 
4 G.F. Schueler, (1996: 315). 
5 The same point of the naturalness of morality was emphasized by Annette Baier. For details 
see, Annette Baier, (1996: 5-17) 
6 Gregory Vlastos (1946: 54). (I deliberately put these concepts in italics. These concepts 
would be used to explicate the point that ethics is a natural, scientific and technical 
phenomenon.) 
7 Quine, W.V.O. (1969: 26) 
8 Quine. W.V.O, (1981:55) 
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similarity: some of these standards are innate, others are acquired.”9 Other 
components include awareness of the object of value by the subject. The choices 
that are made are consequent upon the epistemological component of belief. 
Moreover, according to Quine, our value involves pleasures and pains. In this 
respects too, there are innate likes and dislikes as well as acquired likes and 
dislikes, which guide our choices. Since rational human beings would naturally 
want to maximize pleasure and avoid pain, the standard of perceptual 
similarities becomes an essential instrument in evaluating episodes 
appropriately, either as pleasurable or painful. Hence, “the drive to increase or 
decrease the similarity will…vary with the degree of pleasantness or 
unpleasantness of the earlier episode.”10  
According to Quine, “the similarity standards are the epistemic component 
of habit formation, in its primordial form, and the reward-penalty (pleasure-
pain) axis is the valuative component.”11 The similarity standard becomes the 
instrument that shapes human’s thoughts and world-views. This is clearer as 
Democritus notes, “the nature of the soul is not fixed by original pattern of the 
soul-atoms. This pattern itself can be changed: Teaching re-forms a man, and by 
re-forming, makes his nature.” 12 This explains the Democritus’s dictum 
“teaching that makes nature”. What could be derived from this is the point that 
epistemology is prior to metaphysics. This is because it is what you know that 
shapes your world. However, for Quine, the relationship between epistemology 
and ethics is complementary. For him, “(c)learly, all learning, all acquisition of 
dispositions to discriminatory behaviour, requires in the subject this bipartite 
equipment: it requires a similarity space (epistemological component) and it 
requires some ordering of episodes along the valuation axis(ethics), however 
crude.”13 It is this exercise of fulfilling these bipartite requirements that 
exacerbates the science and technicality of moral discourse. The similarity space 
and the ordering of episodes are being studied, progressively changed and 
elaborated through scientific method of induction, and eventually, hypothetico-
deductive method.  
                                                 
9 Gibson. R.F. “Quine on Ethics” unpublished p.5 
10 Quine. (1974: 28) 
11 Quine. (1981: 55) 
12 Gregory Vlastos. (1946: 54) 
13 Quine. (1981: 56) 
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An example will suffice in illustrating how these methods of natural sciences 
are used in realizing values. If we discover that a particular kind of act or thing, 
say X, always produce a desired end, say Y, and since, every normal human 
being would always want a repeat of what is desirable, it is probable that there 
would be desire to repeat X in order to get Y. Hence, for example, it is on the 
basis of inductive reasoning that I infer that a new computer system will serve 
me well on the ground that I got very good service from a number of computer 
systems earlier purchased from the same manufacturer. Again, if a new book by 
a certain author is introduced to me, I infer that I will enjoy reading it on the 
basis of having read and enjoyed other books by that same author. It is, also, by 
induction that I reason that my car, made of metal would have a dent if it hits a 
harder object, this is because I have observed several cars made with metals 
that got dents when hit against harder objects. Having experienced an event or 
a thing being followed by the same effect always, the scenario is now believed to 
be part of nature. The experiences are summarized into general laws or universal 
generalizations. For example, having observed that cars made with metal get 
dents when hit against harder objects, I then generalize that ‘All objects made 
with metal when hit against a harder object will have a dent’. On this basis, 
once I see a car, made of metal, hit against a harder object, I deduce, without 
further observation that the car must have a dent. This is clearly an example of 
the hypothetico-deductive method. 
In the same vein, this scenario also obtains in terms of valuations.14 
According to Quine, when “we learn by induction that one sort of event tend to 
lead to another that we prize” (It is important to note as earlier remarked, that 
this inductive process, is an epistemological component that human beings 
possess innately or acquired) and then by a process of transfer we may come to 
prize the former not only as a means but for itself”15. This means that on the 
issue of values, reasoning starts from induction, by observing instances of what 
event or thing is valuable and or otherwise. On the basis of these observations, 
these events or things are valued for themselves, not because they lead to other 
                                                 
14 It is important to note that valuation is an inevitable exercise for beings. As Shirk notes, 
‘value is assigned to people, places, acts, sensations, or thoughts. This is an exercise that is 
almost inevitable in human affairs. For details on value and different dimensions on value, 
see Shirk Evelyn (1965) 
15 Quine (1981: 57) 
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values. These events or things, valued for their own sake, therefore, become the 
conditions of assessing other kinds of event or thing. 
This, according to Quine, also obtains in ethics. As he reasons, “many sorts of 
good behaviour have a low initial rating on the valuation scale, and are indulged 
in at first only for their inductive links to higher ends.”16 These good behaviours 
are arrived at through inductive reasoning, and they are used to generate higher 
ends, which are valued for themselves. The good behaviours, therefore, become 
means and the higher ends become the end. Hence, the good behaviour forms 
the premises of an inductive argument in which the higher end is the conclusion. 
The more the instances of the good behaviour are obtained, the more the higher 
end is confirmed. The good behaviour becomes a moral value if it is turned into 
an end-in-itself or a higher-end; which is demanded for its own sake, not as 
means to an end. This is done by making the good behaviour a general 
statement or a universal generalisation in a hypothetico-deductive method of 
reasoning. For Quine, it is this process of “transmutation of means into ends… 
(that) underlies moral training”17. Take for example, in Yoruba culture, if I 
prostrate to greet someone, my action will be applauded a good behaviour. This 
good behaviour becomes a premise of a higher end, say, respect. For Quine, the 
act becomes a moral value when the good behaviour, which is a mean to an end, 
transmuted into an end, and is therefore valued for itself and no longer as a 
means to an end. So, the act is performed habitually without experiencing the 
slightest applause. Hence, a general law ensued, through which other similar 
behaviour is assessed. Thus, consider this example:  
(1) “it is a good behaviour for Yoruba male child to prostrate while greeting 
an elderly person” 
(2) Biodun is a Yoruba male child 
(3) Biodun prostrated while greeting his father 
(4) Therefore, Biodun’s act is a good behaviour. 
The above is an instance of a hypothetico deductive method of reasoning. (1) 
is a hypothetical statement under which (2) and (3), the initial conditions or 
                                                 
16 Quine (1981:57) 
17 Quine (1981: 57) 
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instances, are subsumed, and once these two hold, (4) the conclusion is derived. 
It is through this system of reasoning that moral value is produced among 
human beings. This, indeed, is a technical affair, hence, as Quine remarks, “good 
behaviour, insofar, is technology”18. Quine’s distinction between moral value 
from other kinds of values is summarized by Gibson: “moral values, as opposed 
to moral values, are ‘irreducibly social’, i.e., they are oriented towards the 
satisfactions of others”19 The important point that is being underscored in this 
section is that moral values and moral standards are derived in the same way as 
scientific theories are derived.  
 
3. Ethics and the Charge of Methodological Infirmity 
 
The process of transmutation of means to ends as explicated above suggests that 
ethics follows the same pattern of reasoning in establishing moral values, as is 
the case in natural sciences. The establishment of this point should ordinarily 
provide a ground for accepting ethics as belonging to the naturalist family. 
However, Quine argues that the parity between ethics and science does not hold 
in respect of the method required in settling disagreements. For him, when 
disagreements occur on moral matters, “one regrets the methodological 
infirmity of ethics as compared with science”.20 He argues that there are 
empirical events or states of affair, which serve as empirical footholds of 
scientific theories. For example, there is the actual event of water getting boiled 
at 100oc, which confirms or corroborates the scientific principle that “water 
boils at 100oc”. Similarly, there is the actual event of deliberate killing of 
innocent persons, which serve as empirical foothold of the moral code, ‘murder, 
i.e., deliberate killing of person, is bad’. The problem is that “whereas, (in 
science) we can test a prediction against the independent course of observable 
nature, we can judge the morality of an act only by our moral standards 
themselves.”21 So, in case of disagreements about whether or not water boils at 
100oc, we can point to the physical fact of the actual event of water getting 
boiled at 100oc, as the evidence for the justification of the prediction embedded 
                                                 
18 Quine (1981: 57) 
19 Gibson (Unpublished:10) 
20 Quine (1981:63) 
21 Quine (1981: 63). Italics mine. 
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in the scientific theory – water boils at 100oc –, regrettably, there is no such fact 
of badness or wrongness, out there in the world, that would serve as evidence in 
the judgement of the act of deliberate killing of innocent persons as being 
morally bad or morally wrong, other than making a recourse back to the moral 
standard – ‘deliberate killing of person is bad’. Hence, “science, thanks to its 
link with observation, retains some title to a correspondence theory of truth, 
but a coherence theory is evidently the lot of ethics22. This is because there is no 
observable entity that ethics can be linked to in the world.  
As Quine further notes, “extrapolation in science, however, is under the 
welcome restraint of stubborn fact: failure of prediction. Extrapolation in 
morals has only our unsettled moral values themselves to answer to, and it is 
these that the extrapolation was meant to settle”23. It is on the basis of the 
unavailability of observable entity in ethical discourse that renders ethics 
incompetent as being a natural enterprise. Ethics belongs to the normative 
discourse, which is bound by its internal strings of, mostly debatable and non-
objective, laws and theories, which are often the sources of moral disagreements 
and moral conflicts.  
To repeat, Quine’s charge is that in an attempt to resolve moral 
disagreements or moral conflicts, there are no ‘empirical checkpoints’, which are 
the solace of the scientist. Hence, ethics and science differ in a major respect, 
thus, the two belong into different boats. In what follows, we shall examine 
arguments for and against this position. In the end, an attempt is made to make 
a case for the ontology of moral facts, which when observed, would break the 
circle of reference to moral standard in order to justify moral judgments, and, 
hence, bridge the gap between science and morality. 
There are at most, two known naturalists who had commented on the subject 
of Quinean ethnics. They are Flanagan24 and Morton White25. For its sharp 
relevance to the dimension of arguments being sketched, I shall be concerned 
                                                 
22 Quine (1981: 63) 
23 Quine (1981: 65) 
24 Flanagan O. J. (1982: 56-74) 
25 Morton White (1986: 649-662). White’s suggestion is that feeling would play the same role 
that physical facts play in observation. So, ethical judgment would then correspond to 
feelings in order to be justified. This suggestion was, however, refuted by Quine. For him, our 
feeling is part of the moral evaluation that needs justification. It is what conforms to this 
moral evaluation in the natural world that renders ethics methodologically infirmed. For 
details, see Quine, W.V. (1986: 663-665) 
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with Flanagan’s attempt to advance the project of naturalizing. My 
understanding of Gibson’s critique of Flanagan raises some issues, which needs 
further scrutiny. Notwithstanding these issues, Gibson’s critique of Flanagan 
obviates the charge of methodological infirmity leveled against ethics.  
Flanagan’s contention of Quine’s charge of methodological infirmity in ethics 
is not aimed at removing the infirmity. Rather, Flanagan argues that the charge 
is unwarranted because such a problem is not peculiar to ethics, but is a 
characteristic of all significant discourses. In the main, Flanagan argues that 
following Quine’s holism, it is no longer fashionable for science to rely on 
observation as the paradigm of objectivity. Just like what obtained in ethics, 
the coherence theory of truth is also the lot of science, hence, it makes no sense 
to distinguish between science and ethics on the basis of methodology.  
Gibson’s challenge of Flanagan’s position is that the latter is based on a 
misconstrued notion of the nature and scope of Quine’s holism. Gibson shows 
that while Flanagan’s conception of Quine’s holism as, in summary, ‘that all 
checks are ultimately intersystemic’, is too broad, and therefore, erroneously 
concluded that ethics and science belong to the same boat, the correct 
conception of Quine’s holism is a form of mitigated holism, which allows some 
sense of distinction between observation sentences and other kinds of sentences. 
The former have their own meaning derived from observation, while the latter 
derive their meanings from being members of a system. The crux of Gibson’s 
challenge to Flanagan’s understanding of Quine’s holism is the failure to make 
this distinction. With this distinction, the gulf between science and ethics 
remains. What Gibson did not show, however, is that the observation sentences 
are mainly the lot of science. In other words, Gibson ought to show that ethical 
judgments cannot behave like observation sentences. In response, Gibson’s 
acceptance, following Falanagan’s that ethical statements can also have relation 
to experience, could suggest that ethics, just like science, has some title to the 
correspondence theory. However, Gibson thwarted this line of thought by 
reiterating Quine’s earlier charge, though in another language, to show that 
Flanagan’s suggestion, that consequence of a moral practice would be the 
observable fact that such ethical statements would correspondence to, would 
not suffice. Gibson insisted that in relation to moral values, there has to be 
objective facts, indisputable facts, which would exhibit the morality of the act: 
the wrongness or goodness, as the case may be, of the act, which ethical 
statements would correspond to. Without these facts, Quine’s thesis of 
methodological infirmity remains. 
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It is pertinent to note that the problem explicated above is the root of the 
dispute between the proponents of the moral realist and moral anti-realist. The 
problem is described as follow: “Physicists appeal to the presence of protons to 
explain the observation of vapor trails in a cloud chamber. The vapor trails act 
on our visual system to produce an observation of them, and, with background 
knowledge, an observation that protons have passed through the cloud 
chamber, producing the vapor trail. But in the moral case there is nothing 
present in the objective facts to act on perceptual systems to produce the 
observations about moral rightness. Subject-side factors alone suffice to account 
for whatever moral observations or beliefs are generated in the situation”26. As a 
response to this anti-realist position, the moral realist argues to establish the 
ontology of moral facts. However, I believe that the threshold of the argument 
for the unity of ethics and science on the basis of the method of settling disputes 
is by establishing the ontology of independent, objective and moral facts which 
exists as parts of the fabrics of the world. Once established, it is to these facts 
that moral judgements or statements would correspond. In what follows, I shall 
attempt to articulate arguments that establish the ontology of moral facts.  
 
4. Moral Facts as the Threshold of Naturalized Ethics 
 
“Can’t you see that this is wrong?” “Could you imagine this being right?” “How 
could you have done such a thing like that (which is wrong)?” These are questions 
that appeals to the fact of the wrongness of a particular act. In each case, the 
questioner invites the listener to see, imagine, and consider the fact that the act 
in question is wrong. What is being demanded is to, like natural fact which is 
out there, independent of the observer; establish the ontology of the fact of 
wrongness as an observable, objective entity that exists independently of the 
moral subjects. 
What I propose, however, is that moral fact is an ‘entity’ that exists in all 
possible world, in which there is no world in which moral discourse operates and 
the fact would be denied. By this I mean that the ‘entity’ wrongness in a moral 
judgment, such as, ‘This act is wrong’, ‘exists’, not as entities in the ‘actual 
world’, and observable through empirical apparatus with which natural facts 
are observed, moral facts are kinds of entities that are ‘observable’ as a possible 
                                                 
26 Rottschaefer, W.A. (1999: 1) 
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entity in every ‘possible moral world’. In this possible moral world, these moral 
facts are ‘observable’ giving its stipulated laws and principles. It is this entity 
that is referred to when we say that ‘an act, say x, is wrong. In this case, x is 
wrong if and only if x is wrong in every possible world in which x exists’. The 
point is that x being wrong in every possible world is the fact that is being 
appealed to in the moral judgment: ‘x is morally wrong’. If there is a possible 
world in which x would be right, then the moral judgment that ‘x is morally 
wrong’ would not correspond to any moral fact. So, when I say that ‘Can’t you 
see that this act is wrong?’ I am only inviting you to ‘observe’ the fact that 
there is no possible world in which the act exists and it is morally right. If my 
hearer could justifiably show that there is a world in which the act is right, then 
my moral judgment would not correspond to any fact.  
What derives from this understanding of moral fact is that the actual 
wrongness of a morally wrong act is not an empirical entity; it is a fact because 
it is not corrigible in the present and any possible world. Though, the fact is not 
observable in the same sense in which natural facts are observed, they are 
observed by all the subjects concerned by searching through the entities in all 
possible worlds in order to see there is no fact that run contrary to the moral 
fact. 
This account of moral facts above rests heavily on the notion of possible 
world. It is also based on a distinction between ‘world actual’ and ‘morally 
possible world’. A detailed discussion on the notion and problems associated 
with possible world is beyond the scope of this paper. I shall, however, offer a 
brief discussion of these notions in order to explicate my position.  
‘Possible world’ is one of the numerous terms used by philosophers to 
elucidate, analyse and proffer solutions to a number of philosophical problems.27 
However, the question ‘what is a possible world?’ is a philosophical problem 
that has no consensus solution. However, there are, among others, two 
prominent positions. The first is the extreme realist position, largely attributed 
                                                 
27 The notion of a possible world is not new in Philosophy. The Pre-Socratics had in one way 
or the other postulated the idea of possible worlds in their speculations about reality. Of 
particular interest is Parmenides idea of two ways of the world and the Atomists’: 
Leucippus’s and Democritus’s idea of ‘unboundedly many worlds’. For detailed account of 
the Pre-Socratic conceptions of possible worlds and what they use it to achieve, see Kirk, G.S. 
et al, (1983). In the contemporary epochs, the notion is commonly used by philosophers in 
modal logic to elucidate the distinction between necessity and possibility. The notion is 
prominent among Kripke, Plantinga and David Lewis to mention just a few. 
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to David Lewis, which maintained that a possible world is another real or 
concrete world just like ours. On this view, the notion of possible worlds is not 
just a philosophical tool useful for the purpose of elucidating philosophical 
arguments or claims. Possible worlds are real in some way. In this conception of 
possible world, what makes worlds distinct is that they are spatio-temporally 
separated from one another. In other words, every way that a world could have 
been is a way that some existing physical world really is. So, possible worlds are 
real worlds and they actually exist in the same sense the real or concrete world 
we inhabit exists.28  
The other position is the moderate realist position supported by Alvin 
Plantinga, A. Adams and others, who have claimed that a possible world, is 
nothing but an abstract entity, and does not really exist. For the moderate 
realist, the notion of a possible world is merely a useful philosophical tool for 
making arguments. The moderate realist position is that the notion of a possible 
world refers to the ways we imagine that the world could have been different 
from the way it is. A possible world is a way a universe might have been. 
Possible worlds are counterfactual states of affairs. States of affairs are abstract 
entities that such phrases as  
(1) ‘Socrates died after drinking poison’ 
and  
(2) ‘Socrates having lived after drinking poison’  
refer to. Some states of affairs obtain, others do not. Proposition (1) refers to 
a state of affairs that obtained and proposition (2) refers to a state of affairs that 
does not obtain. Though the latter does not obtain, it is a possible state of 
affairs. It is different from a logically impossible and either causally or 
empirically impossible state of affairs.29 The concept of a state of affairs is used 
to define what a possible world is. We imagine some states of affairs as being 
different from what they in fact are. These different states of affair are referred 
to as possible worlds.30 As opposed to the extreme realist view that possible 
worlds are concrete worlds that exit just as our world exists, the moderate 
                                                 
28 Lewis, David (1986:2) 
29 A state of affairs that is logically impossible if it does not respect the law of contradiction. 
For example, a state of affair such as ‘it is raining and it is not raining’ is logically impossible. 
A state of affair is causally or naturally impossible if it stipulates what cannot be physically 
achieved. For example, the state of affair ‘Obasanjo having swum through all seas in the 
world’ or ‘Obasanjo having spent 1 million years on earth’. 
30 Alvin Plantinga (1978: 44). 
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realists assert that possible worlds are possible or imagined state of affair. It is 
how a world could possibly have been. 
Following the extreme realist arguments, it may mean that there is no 
difference between the actual world and other possible worlds. This is because, 
for them, ‘the actual world’ means ‘the world where I am located’, and each 
possible world is actual from the point of view of its inhabitants. The term 
‘actual’ is an indexical term like ‘I’. It means ‘part of the world of which I am a 
part’ or ‘part of the world of which this utterance is a part’. What Lewis means 
by the claim that ‘actual’ is an indexical is that actuality is not a necessary 
property of a particular world. According to Lewis, “surely, it is a contingent 
matter which world is actual. A contingent matter is one that varies from world 
to world. At one world, the contingent matter goes one way; at another, 
another. So, at one world, one world is actual; and at another, another. How can 
this be absolute actuality? – The relativity is manifest!”31  
This means that every world is potentially actual; actuality is a property 
relative to all possible worlds. An Actual world is only one of other possible 
worlds. It is called an “actual world,” not because it is different in kind from 
other possible worlds, but because it is the world in which the speaker inhabits. 
To the inhabitants of other worlds, their worlds are actual.32  Put differently, for 
Lewis, the word ‘actual’ and the phrase ‘the actual world’ being indexicals are 
rigid designators. Lewis’s argument is that when I utter the word ‘I’, it denotes 
me. Innumerable number of persons could utter the word ‘I’ at the same time; 
the referent of the word is each individual who utters the word.   
However, Lewis’ view about actuality rests on the realist assumption that 
there are other worlds that exist just as the world we live in and the inhabitants 
of these worlds are just as we are; it is this assumption that needs to be proved. 
The argument about indexicality of ‘actual’ and ‘actual world’ merely shows 
that all the possible worlds are potentially actual. There is a difference between 
a potentially actual world and a real world. The real world is different because 
apart from being actual, it is real, while the other actual worlds remain at the 
level of potentiality. However, Lewis’ account would not admit this distinction. 
This is because, for him, there is no difference between worlds. All worlds are the 
same. The moderate realists would accept the distinction, and this makes their 
account more plausible. Let us explore moderate realism on the actuality of 
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possible worlds.  
The moderate realists states that the actual world differs in ontological status 
from merely possible ones in that it is the only world that obtains. For 
Plantinga, ‘an actual world is a maximal possible world that obtains.’33  This 
implies that an actual world has the same status as the other possible worlds, 
but it is special because it obtains.  A possible world that obtains is one that 
actually exists. While other possible worlds remain non-actual, the actual world 
is real. An actual world is a description of a state of affairs that is real, different 
from ‘how things could have been’. ‘How things could have been’ is the 
description of possible worlds. So, possible worlds are different from actual 
worlds. The latter is real, while the former is merely possible. For moderate 
realism on possible world, only one world obtains, and it is that world that is 
named actual world. All other worlds that do not obtain exist as possible 
worlds.34  
Given this understanding, the natural world is the actual world. It is the 
picture of how the world is actually is. The possible worlds are how the world 
could have been. A possible moral world is not an actual moral world, it is how a 
moral world could have been; it is, following the moderate realist position, an 
imagined or possible moral state of affair.   
The point I am canvassing is that the moral facts are real in the sense that 
they exist in all possible moral worlds. A moral judgment is tested against a 
moral fact that exists in all possible worlds; it is a fact because it is found in 
possible worlds, and there is no world in which its contrary is found. If, however, 
there is a possible world where it is justifiably shown that the moral fact does 
not exist, then the moral judgment would not correspond to any moral fact. 
Such a judgment is therefore false. In this respect, moral fact, the wrongness in a 
moral judgment – deliberate killing is morally wrong – is a fact, if and only if, it 
is shown that there exists no possible moral world in which the act is of 
deliberate killing is morally right.  
The mistake the naturalists like Quine makes is to treat moral fact as an 
entity, like neutron, proton, neurons etc, all of which are physical entities that 
exist in the physical or actual world. Moral facts are facts of a kind which exist 
in all possible worlds. I would have agreed with G.E. Moore35 that those who are 
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looking for moral facts among natural facts commits naturalistic fallacy, 
however, I disagree with Moore’s description of moral properties as some kind of 
‘simple, unanalysable properties’ which are wholly distinct from other natural 
properties. This is because this conception makes moral properties and moral 
facts to be some kind of queer and mysterious entities36. Moral facts, in my own 
understanding, are not entities. They are facts about how things are in all 
possible worlds. This fact justifies the truth of a moral judgment if and only if 
there is no possible moral world where it does not exist.  What I accept from 
Moore and Mackie is that moral facts are not observable or discoverable by 
empirical investigation; they are, however, not entities, either mysterious or 
queer. They are facts in any possible moral world, which are appealed to in 
moral discourses.  
Some possible problems that could be raised against my understanding of 
moral facts are: first, it could be argued that my account does not establish the 
ontology of moral facts. Unlike physical facts to which we can identify and 
observe, are moral facts identifiable or locatable in all possible moral worlds? 
This view rests wholly on ontological naturalism, which holds that “only 
natural objects, kinds and properties are real.”37 If this were correct, possible 
moral worlds would have to be physical or actual worlds, and moral facts would 
have to exist physically in such worlds. However, given our understanding of 
possible moral worlds as the way moral discourse could have been or a possible 
moral state of affair, possible moral worlds are not the same as physical worlds; 
hence, moral facts in these worlds are not physical facts; they are facts that 
exist in such possible worlds.  
Another problem is that suppose it is conceded that moral facts are some 
kind of facts that exist in possible moral worlds, the question is how would this 
help the case of naturalizing ethics? In other worlds, since moral facts do not 
obey natural laws and principles, then ethics could not be declared a natural 
discipline. In response, I wish to argue that the project of naturalizing ethics 
needs not follow the way of ontological naturalism; I think it could be modeled 
                                                 
36 This is the same sense in which moral facts have been described by J.L Mackie who noted 
that there were objective moral values (moral facts), then they would be entities or qualities 
or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. 
Correspondingly, if we wee aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of 
moral perception or intuition, utterly different form our ordinary ways of knowing 
everything else”. See Mackie J.L. (1988: 115). 
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towards methodological naturalism. The methodological naturalists do not 
claim parity among all disciplines, they simply hold that “the best methods of 
inquiry in the social sciences or philosophy are, or are to be modeled on, those of 
the natural sciences.”38 In this respect, it is not essential that in modeling an 
inquiry on philosophy on the method of the natural sciences that all the 
apparatus used in one must be of the same kind in the other.  
What I am trying to establish is that moral facts are facts of moral discourse, 
which obtain in every possible moral world. True moral judgments correspond 
to these facts in order to ascertain their truth or falsity. This method 
establishing the truth or otherwise of moral judgments is modeled on the 
method of testing theories in natural worlds. However, while in the natural 
sciences, scientists rely on their own kind of facts (natural) to confirm their 
theories, ethicists rely on their own kind of facts: moral facts, which exist in 
every possible moral world, to confirm their moral judgments. In order to 
confirm a natural judgment or theory, the natural or actual world is observed in 
order to establish the presence of natural facts, once these are discovered, the 
judgment is confirmed. In the same way, moral philosopher search through the 
possible moral worlds to establish that the fact of the moral judgment is 
present, once this is established, the moral judgment is confirmed.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The crux of one of Quine’s argument in “On the Nature of Moral Values” that I 
addressed in this paper is that ethics does not belong to the same class of 
naturalism to which ontology and epistemology have been admitted. The main 
reason for denying ethics membership of naturalism, according to Quine, is that 
ethics as compared to science, is methodologically infirmed. This is because 
there are no moral facts in the world to which moral judgments correspond, 
through which moral judgments could be confirmed. Having explicated this 
problem, I attempted to show that, though not in the same natural or actual 
world, moral facts exist in every possible moral world. Once there is no possible 
world in which the judgment is contradicted, then the truth of the moral 
judgment is a moral fact. It is this moral fact that moral judgments correspond 
to in order to confirm their truth or falsity. Since, this is the method at play in 
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science, I, therefore, think that Quine’s charge that ethics is methodologically 
infirm can be challenged. 
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